The housing crisis that began with the "Great Recession" led to a dramatic increase in home foreclosures, and these foreclosures likely had subsequent impacts on local government tax revenues. We investigate the impacts of foreclosures on local government tax revenues, using a reduced form estimation approach that relates changes in foreclosures to changes in local government tax revenues. Unlike most previous work, we examine the nationwide revenue impacts of foreclosures, using data across all local governments in the entire United States during the worst years of the Great Recession. We also examine the impacts of foreclosures on other local government sources of revenues beyond property tax revenues, including revenue sources that were likely affected by the impacts of foreclosures both on household wealth and on other forms of economic activity. Further, we focus in some specifications on the revenue effects for school districts only. Finally, we extend our analysis to the impacts of foreclosures on state governments revenues (and expenditures). Throughout, we use an instrumental variable approach to control for possible endogeneity of foreclosures and housing prices. Overall, we find evidence that the foreclosures created by the Great Recession had a direct, negative, but small effect on total tax revenues at the local level, although there is only weak evidence that this impact can be attributed to declines in local property taxes. However, we find that foreclosures had an indirect and negative impact on local governments via declines in state government funding. We suggest that foreclosures may have affected the real economy, thereby reducing the state government revenues dependent on real economic activity that were used to finance transfers to local governments.
INTRODUCTION
The housing market contraction that began with the so-called "Great Recession" of [2007] [2008] [2009] has been blamed for much of the financial distress among local governments (The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2010; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2010; Mikesell and Mullins, 2010) . Many observers believe that the financial crisis, fueled by subprime mortgage defaults, affected public sector institutions at all levels by putting much pressure on their budgets. While the channels are numerous and sometimes indirect, a common perception is that the foreclosures resulting from these defaults had a particularly large and negative impact on local government revenues, especially property tax revenues.
Reacting to such perceptions, a typical response from elected representatives was to introduce legislation to require a bank or other financial institution starting a foreclosure process to pay the affected jurisdiction the outstanding property taxes on the property.
1 Indeed, when acquiring the title of a foreclosed home, the bank or financial institution does in fact assume all financial responsibilities of the home, including paying for upkeep, security, taxes, and insurance. However, these bank obligations do not appear to be binding while the property is still in the process of foreclosure; that is, the bank is only responsible once the bank regains possession of the property, a stage commonly known as "Real Estate Owned" (REO). This institutional feature, coupled with the likelihood that increasing numbers of foreclosures create both an excess supply of properties available for sale and so downward pressure on house prices, suggests that local governments could indeed experience a decrease in property tax revenue.
To date, much of the literature has focused on the negative effect of foreclosures on home prices and, through this channel, on the subsequent effect of home prices on local government property tax revenues. If local governments adjust tax assessment values quickly, then a decline in home prices can indeed have a negative impact on property tax revenues (Doerner and Ihlanfeldt, 2011; Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist, 2011) . Further, even if property tax revenues are not significantly affected due to slow adjustment in assessed values, total tax revenues may be adversely affected through other channels. As suggested theoretically by Lutz, Molloy, and Shan (2011) and demonstrated empirically by Mian, Suffi, and Trebbi (2015) , the severity of the Great
Recession not only affected house prices, but also other components of the real economy such as income, consumption, and, especially, wealth, with impacts on taxes imposed on these tax bases.
Clearly, foreclosures can have both direct and indirect effects on local government revenues.
Foreclosures can also have impacts on state government revenues.
However, establishing the link between foreclosures and these various economic variables -property tax revenues, other tax revenues, and broader economic outcomes -is complicated by the issue of causality. Foreclosures may reduce housing prices, which in turn reduce local tax revenues. Indeed, the presence of many realized foreclosures in a given area may affect nearby home values through two mechanisms: there may be a supply effect, in which foreclosures increase the supply of available homes and thus decrease home values; there may also be a disamenity effect created by the increase in foreclosed and neglected homes, in which homeowners become less likely to take care of a home that has entered a foreclosure process.
Research to date shows that foreclosures have affected nearby home prices via both mechanisms.
However, one mechanism has tended to dominate the other, depending on the type of neighborhood: low-priced, low-income, high-density, and high-crime neighborhoods tend to experience disamenity effects, while the supply effect appears to be stronger in most other neighborhoods (Immergluch and Geoff, 2006; Schuetz, Been, and Ellen, 2008; Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao, 2009; Hartley, 2010; Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak, 2011; Towe and Lawley, 2013; Anenber and Kung, 2014; Fisher, Lambie-Hanson, and Willen, 2015, Alm et al. 2016 ).
However, a reverse causation between foreclosures and housing prices is also possible; that is, a weakening economy may lower housing prices, which then increases foreclosures, so that a decline in home values may be a causal factor in an increase in foreclosures. This reverse causation is something that many observers believe happened in the U.S. real estate crisis that began with Great Recession. As the market values of their homes fell, many homeowners found that their houses were worth less than the value of their mortgage loans; indeed, some homeowners owned multiple homes, which led them to foreclose strategically on multiple homes.
Determining the exact causal link is difficult and still unresolved (Lutz, 2008; Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles, 2008; Lutz, Molloy, and Shan, 2011; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi, 2015; Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2015) . Even so, it is certainly plausible that the combination of declining home values and foreclosures can cause a vicious cycle that can significantly affect local tax revenues. Estimating the revenue impact of foreclosures requires dealing with the potential endogeneity of foreclosures.
There are some studies that have tried to look at the relationship between foreclosures and property tax revenues. To date, most have examined specific cases. For example, Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist (2011) focus on the state of Georgia, Vlaicu and Whalley (2011) provide results for California, Doerner and Ihlanfeldt (2011) focus on Florida, and Skidmore and Scorsone (2011) examine the specific circumstances of Detroit. In addition, Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2015) examine the impact of foreclosures on Florida local governments, extending the usual analysis to both the revenue side and the expenditure side of government budgets. For the most part, these studies find that foreclosures are associated with lower government revenues, although the effect is often surprisingly small. Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2015) also find significant impacts of foreclosures on expenditures, via such as channels as additional local government spending on fire, police, and social expenditures.
In this paper, we examine the link between foreclosures and local government revenues.
We make several contributions. First, we focus on the broader and more comprehensive national experience, as opposed to a single state or jurisdiction. Second, we also examine the impact of foreclosures on other local government sources of revenues beyond property tax revenues, including revenue sources that were likely affected by the impact of foreclosures on household wealth and other forms of economic activity (e.g., income, consumption). Third, in some specifications we focus specifically on school district revenues, a sector that is particularly reliant on property taxes. Fourth, we also estimate the foreclosure impact on state government revenues and expenditures (including state government transfers to local governments), in an attempt to identify the channels through which foreclosures affected governments. In all of our empirical work, we deal explicitly with potential endogeneity of foreclosures, following the instrumental variable approach by Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2015) in their important recent work, in which we use state foreclosure laws as an instrument to identify the effect of foreclosures.
Overall, we find evidence that the foreclosures created by the Great Recession had a direct, negative, but small effect on total tax revenues at the local level, although there is only weak evidence that this negative effect can be attributed to declines in local property taxes. This result stems in large part from the great diversity in local government experience across the nation: even though local governments' property tax revenues may have been affected in some states, as often found in previous work, this effect may not be generalizable to the nation as a whole. This result also may follow from the lags in government adjustments in assessed/taxable values.
Interestingly, we also find that foreclosures had an indirect and negative impact on local governments via declines in state government funding. We suggest that foreclosures may have affected the real economy, as suggested by Mian, Suffi, and Trebbi (2015) , thereby reducing state government revenues dependent on real economic activity. This indirect effect of foreclosures therefore limited the ability of state governments to transfer money to local governments via intergovernmental transfers. School districts were particularly affected by the decrease in state funding, although data limitations prevent us from examining the effect on other specific types of local governments.
FRAMEWORK, DATA, AND ESTIMATION METHODS

Framework
The Great Recession was an extraordinary shock that affected households in many different ways. The starting point was a significant decline in home values that led many homeowners to default on their mortgage payments and often to face foreclosure of their homes.
As summarized by Mian, Suffi, and Trebbi (2015) , evidence suggests the additional number of foreclosed homes put downward pressure on house prices, creating a "vicious spiral" in which foreclosures led to lower house prices, which in turn led to more foreclosures, and so on. There are also likely indirect effects of the Great Recession on local governments.
Foreclosures had significant negative effects on real economic activity, decreasing household wealth and other forms of economic activity like income and consumption. The decline in economic activity likely led to declines in taxes, especially individual and corporate income taxes, retail sales taxes, and excise taxes (Lutz, Molloy, and Shan, 2011) , taxes that are generally (if not always) of more importance to state governments than to local governments. 3 In addition, most local governments typically receive significant amounts of funding from other sources, especially from state (and federal) government transfers, because most local jurisdictions do not generate sufficient funds to finance completely their local government expenditures from their 2 The assessment process is analyzed in detail by Diaz (1990) , Quan and Quigley (1991) , Wolverton and Gallimore (1999), and McAllister et al. (2003) . 3 Sjoquist (2009, 2011) found that these indirect effects on revenues can be substantial.
own sources. Transfers also are used to equalize local government spending, especially for public education. If state government budgets were also affected by foreclosures, it is plausible that local governments may have been indirectly affected through decreases in state aid.
In sum, our framework suggests that the Great Recession may have had both a direct impact on local government revenues through its effect on foreclosures and an indirect impact on local government revenues through its effect on state government budgets.
Data
We focus However, since property taxes play an especially important role in public school budgets, we also focus on public schools in some specifications. A separate section of the Census contains public elementary and secondary education finance data across U.S. school districts from 2007 through 2011. These data include identification and geographical variables such as the school system identification number (NCESID), the state core-based statistical area (CBSA), and the county where each school district is located. Additionally, those data include the total number of pupils enrolled in the system, the total revenues and expenditures of the school system, and a (2014) and Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2015) , RealtyTrac collects data on five types of filings, each of which depends on the state of the foreclosure process. A "notice of default" (NOD) and a "lis pendens" (LIS) are filings that occur prior to the auction of the foreclosed property. A "notice of trustee sale" (NTS) and a "notice of foreclosure sale" (NFS) are directly associated with the foreclosure auction. If the foreclosed property is purchased by the lender at auction, then the filing is classified as "real-estate owned" (REO). Since the pre-auction filing (either LIS and/or NOD) does not by itself lead to a sale or eviction, we measure total foreclosures per geographic unit as the sum of NTS and NFS. 4 We do not have data on delinquencies or on the number of homeowners with a mortgage. Thus, we normalize foreclosures by the total number of housing units in a given jurisdiction. foreclosures and a decline in total tax revenues and, more specifically, in property tax revenues during the peak of the Great Recession (2008) (2009) ). However, while there appears to be a link for some individual states, it is not clear that there is a link when we look at the entire U.S. Also, any links should be examined holding other variables constant, as we do in our empirical estimation.
We supplement these data with economic and demographic information for each geographic unit from the U.S. Census and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Table 1 presents some descriptive information on these variables.
Estimation Methods
Our basic specification examines the effect of the number of new foreclosures per housing unit in state s (New Foreclosures) on revenue growth of different revenue types for different levels of government in the state, controlling for potential endogeneity of New Foreclosures in a first stage estimation and using the predicted rate in a second stage estimation of revenue growth. We use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure because foreclosures may be endogenously determined. Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2015) suggest using state variation in foreclosure laws as an instrumental variable. Common law in the U.S. dictated that foreclosures should be resolved in court. However, some states have changed the law to allow for non-judicial foreclosures. In states with judicial requirements, foreclosures must go through a court procedure in which the time to clear the process is typically longer. Since foreclosing on a property can be long and costly, banks are understandably interested in a swift process. In contrast, in states without judicial requirements the parties involved in the foreclosure process can avoid court delays, increasing the ability to foreclose faster and thereby also increasing the number of overall foreclosed properties. State variation in foreclosure laws may therefore serve as an appropriate instrument for dealing with potential endogeneity of foreclosures.
More formally, we estimate a two-stage system:
In the first stage equation (1) Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2015) in using the presence of judicial laws as an instrument. It should be noted that, although we can dissagregate the foreclosure rate and school district finances to the county level, the source of identification that we employ comes from the variation in state laws. As such, we aggregate foreclosures, local government finances, and school district finances to the state level, and we conduct our various empirical analyses at the state level.
We look at a number of different revenue categories, including property tax revenues but also additional classifications. As mentioned above, although new foreclosures seem more likely to affect property tax revenue directly via the property tax base, it is also possible that other sources of revenue may have been affected indirectly. In order to control for state characteristics that may have influenced revenues, we include a set of state-specific controls in X is such as An important concern is the geographic concentration of states with judicial foreclosure laws. As seen in Figure 5 , the spatial distribution does not appear random. Although there are some Western states with judicial laws, most of them are concentrated in the Northeast. As noted by Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2015) , it is possible that regional economic shocks, which correlate with foreclosure laws, may drive any results.
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In order to alleviate this concern, we follow Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2015) and perform a state-border analysis for the same 2007-2009 period of analysis. We form pairs of states that border each other (a total of 109 state-pairs), and for each pair we compute the difference (∆) between the two states' foreclosure rates (∆ ), revenue growth (∆ ℎ ), and foreclosure laws (∆ ), where p denotes a state pair. We then instrument the difference in the state-pair's foreclosure rates with the difference in the state-pairs' foreclosure laws, so that the variation in foreclosure rates is driven by differences across states that border each other, and not by regional effects. The 2SLS regression is given by:
Again, p denotes a state pair, and ∆ denotes the difference. 6 We thank an anonymous referee for emphasizing this possibility. Government. A more likely link is that the foreclosure crisis affected some state governments through income, sales, and other taxes, so that they had to adjust their budgets opting to reduce their aid to local governments. We explore this hypothesis further below.
RESULTS
In Table 3 we present similar estimation results for school districts, a local government sector that in many cases relies heavily on property taxes. 8 Although we are unable to disaggregate results into specific types of local governments from the Census data, the Census provides separate financial data on each of the approximately 13,500 school districts. We are able to perform a similar analysis on school district revenues and its components, or Total
Revenues, Revenues from State Government, Revenues from Own Sources, and Revenues from
Local Property Taxes. 9 We now find little statistical evidence of an impact of foreclosures on property tax revenue growth, total revenue growth, or growth in revenue from local sources.
However, as with local governments, we find slower growth in revenue from state governments in school districts located in states where the foreclosure shock was more severe.
10 Tables 4 and 5 contain the results using the bordering state-pair analysis, which attempts to alleviate concerns that our results are driven by regional shocks. In general, we find that our bordering results are robust and mostly consistent with those in Tables 2 and 3 . For all local governments ( We perform a similar analysis using state government finances in order to examine the potential effects that foreclosures may have had on state government budgets. Tables 6 and 7 present the results. We find no evidence of an impact of new foreclosures on any of the components of state revenue growth. However, in unreported results, we find suggestive evidence that there seems to be a state government adjustment in state transfers to school 10 Note that the school finance equalization in the states may contribute to these results. In states with full school finance equalization (e.g., California), school districts may have stronger incentives to adjust the property tax base downward because any lost revenues can be expected to be compensated via state-level school finance equalization contributions. In contrast, in states with little equalization (e.g., Massachusetts) local school districts may have fewer incentives to adjust their tax base downwards. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this observation. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
11 Unlike the case of local governments, state government finance data provide disaggregated information on intergovernmental expenditures to school districts and to other local governments. Also note that education expenditures do not include transfers to school districts, but do include expenditures on higher education. 12 Some further, if mainly suggestive, evidence for the indirect channels through which foreclosures affected local revenues can be seen in some simple correlations between foreclosures and various state-level economic variables. To examine these indirect effects, we calculated the simple correlation coefficient between new foreclosures and several different state economic variables: the growth from 2007 to 2009 in per capita state personal income, in per capita net earnings, and in per capita personal expenditures. The correlations between new foreclosures per housing unit and these three variables are, respectively, -0.6934 (p-value=0.0000) for income, -0.7342 (p-value=0.0000) for earnings, and -0.6984 (p-value=0.0000) for expenditures. These negative correlations are consistent with the notion that foreclosures worked to decrease local revenues mainly through their indirect effects on the economically sensitive tax bases of state governments.
How did new foreclosures generated by the Great Recession affect local government revenues? The results in this paper suggest that the common and widely held notion that local governments were severely hit by the extraordinary increase in foreclosures stemming from the financial crisis is only partially correct. We find some limited evidence that the growth rates of total revenues of local governments in general and school districts in particular were in fact negatively affected on average by foreclosures. Indeed, our results suggest that the impact of foreclosures on the growth of property tax revenues was negative but statistically insignificant.
However, we also find some suggestive evidence that the channel for the impacts both on local governments and on school districts was less through the direct impact of new foreclosures on local tax revenues but more through the indirect impact of the broader financial crisis via state government transfers. In particular, the decline in economic activity generated by the financial crisis (of which the increase in foreclosures was often seen as the most obvious impact) significantly and negatively affected the ability of state governments to maintain their transfers to local school districts. It seems that it was largely through this indirect channel (e.g., state government transfers) that the financial crisis affected school districts.
These results are consistent with the existence of enormous variation in the experiences of local governments. As demonstrated convincingly by the work of others in specific state and local contexts (Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist, 2011; Vlaicu and Whalley, 2011; Doerner and Ihlanfeldt; Skidmore and Scorsone, 2011) , there were certainly instances of severe fiscal stress at the local government level, driven largely by foreclosures. However, there were also many instances were local governments were largely unscathed by the Great Recession. It may well be that our failure to find much of a nationwide impact of foreclosures on local tax revenues is due largely to the commingling of local governments with these widely varying experiences.
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This conclusion does not necessarily mean that another real estate crisis, fueled by accelerated rates of foreclosures, would not be detrimental to local government budgets. Indeed, to the extent that state goverments are affected, and through them local entities like local governments and school districts, one should be concerned with the potential for another similar crisis. This is of particular concern given the recent 2015-2016 surge in home prices. This surge could be a signal of an overheated housing market, and the bursting of this new housing bubble might well lead to similar effects on local government budgets as in the Great Recession. The F-Statistic for the first stage and its corresponding p-value are 10.04 and 0.002. *,**,*** are coefficients statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
New Foreclosures Total Revenues
Revenues
From State Government
Revenues from Own Sources
Revenues from Local Property Taxes Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and are. shown in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients. *,**,*** are coefficients statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
First Stage
